Serological evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in dromedary camels and domestic bovids in Oman.

SARS-CoV-2 has demonstrated the ability to infect a wide range of animal species. Here, we investigated SARS-CoV-2 infection in livestock species in Oman and provided serological evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in cattle, sheep, goats, and dromedary camel using the surrogate virus neutralization and plaque reduction neutralization tests. To better understand the extent of SARS-CoV-2 infection in animals and associated risks, "One Health" epidemiological investigations targeting animals exposed to COVID-19 human cases should be implemented with integrated data analysis of the epidemiologically linked human and animal cases.

Genetic diversity and molecular epidemiology of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus in dromedaries in Ethiopia, 2017-2020.

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is enzootic in dromedary camels and causes zoonotic infection and disease in humans. Although over 80% of the global population of infected dromedary camels are found in Africa, zoonotic disease had only been reported in the Arabia Peninsula and travel-associated disease has been reported elsewhere. In this study, genetic diversity and molecular epidemiology of MERS-CoV in dromedary camels in Ethiopia were investigated during 2017-2020. Of 1766 nasal swab samples collected, 61 (3.5%) were detected positive for MERS-CoV RNA. Of 484 turbinate swab samples collected, 10 (2.1%) were detected positive for MERS-CoV RNA. Twenty-five whole genome sequences were obtained from these MERS-CoV positive samples. Phylogenetically, these Ethiopian camel-originated MERS-CoV belonged to clade C2, clustering with other East African camel strains. Virus sequences from camel herds clustered geographically while in an abattoir, two distinct phylogenetic clusters of MERS-CoVs were observed in two sequential sampling collections, which indicates the greater genetic diversity of MERS-CoV in abattoirs. In contrast to clade A and B viruses from the Arabian Peninsula, clade C camel-originated MERS-CoV from Ethiopia had various nucleotide insertions and deletions in non-structural gene nsp3, accessory genes ORF3 and ORF5 and structural gene N. This study demonstrates the genetic instability of MERS-CoV in dromedaries in East Africa, which indicates that the virus is still actively adapting to its camel host. The impact of the observed nucleotide insertions and deletions on virus evolution, viral fitness, and zoonotic potential deserves further study.

Longitudinal and abattoir-based surveillance of MERS-CoV in camels in Jordan, 2018-2020.

To generate baseline information to help better understand the antibody kinetics and nasal shedding dynamics of MERS-CoV in camels in Jordan, a longitudinal surveillance study was conducted in two phases; phase 1 was between December, 2018 and January, 2019 and phase 2 between August and December 2020. In each phase, two camel herds were studied. These herds were located in Al-azraq and in Al-ramtha area and were named Al-azraq and Al-ramtha herds, respectively. The same camel herd of Al-zarqa area was sampled in both phases while two different camel herds, one in each phase, were sampled in Al-ramtha area. Blood and nasal swabs were collected from same selected animals in all visits to each herd in both phases. Additionally, nasal swabs and retropharyngeal lymph node tissue samples were collected from sixty-one camels slaughtered at Al-ramtha abattoir during phase 2 to enhance virus isolation opportunities and phylogenetic analysis. All sampled animals from Al-azraq camel herd were either borderline or seropositive on spike 1 based ELISA assay and negative on quantitative reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (qRT-PCR) in both phases. In Al-ramtha camel herds, an unsteady pattern prevailed in animals' seropositivity in both phases and viral RNA was detected in all animals in the end of phase 1 and in one animal during phase 2. For the seroconversion, anti-MERS-CoV spike 1 antibodies were detected in two animals in phase 1 in the first collection only. While, in phase 2, intermittent seroconversion pattern was observed in several samples over time of collections that ended with all animals became seropositive in the last collection (after nineteen days from viral RNA detection). In addition, viral RNA was detected in nasal swabs of 3 slaughtered camels. Phylogenetic analysis of a partial fragment of spike 1 gene sequences of all MERS-CoV isolates clustered together with clade B of MERS-CoV. This cluster contains all MERS-CoV sequences obtained either from camels or human sources in the Arabian Peninsula indicating the continuous circulation of this clade also in Jordan.

Phenotypic and genetic characterization of MERS coronaviruses from Africa to understand their zoonotic potential.

Coronaviruses are pathogens of pandemic potential. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) causes a zoonotic respiratory disease of global public health concern, and dromedary camels are the only proven source of zoonotic infection. More than 70% of MERS-CoV-infected dromedaries are found in East, North, and West Africa, but zoonotic MERS disease is only reported from the Arabian Peninsula. We compared viral replication competence of clade A and B viruses from the Arabian Peninsula with genetically diverse clade C viruses found in East (Egypt, Kenya, and Ethiopia), North (Morocco), and West (Nigeria and Burkina Faso) Africa. Viruses from Africa had lower replication competence in ex vivo cultures of the human lung and in lungs of experimentally infected human-DPP4 (hDPP4) knockin mice. We used lentivirus pseudotypes expressing MERS-CoV spike from Saudi Arabian clade A prototype strain (EMC) or African clade C1.1 viruses and demonstrated that clade C1.1 spike was associated with reduced virus entry into the respiratory epithelial cell line Calu-3. Isogenic EMC viruses with spike protein from EMC or clade C1.1 generated by reverse genetics showed that the clade C1.1 spike was associated with reduced virus replication competence in Calu-3 cells in vitro, in ex vivo human bronchus, and in lungs of hDPP4 knockin mice in vivo. These findings may explain why zoonotic MERS disease has not been reported from Africa so far, despite exposure to and infection with MERS-CoV.

Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in Dromedary Camels in Africa and Middle East.

: Dromedary camels are the natural reservoirs of the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). Camels are mostly bred in East African countries then exported into Africa and Middle East for consumption. To understand the distribution of MERS-CoV among camels in North Africa and the Middle East, we conducted surveillance in Egypt, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. We also performed longitudinal studies of three camel herds in Egypt and Jordan to elucidate MERS-CoV infection and transmission. Between 2016 and 2018, a total of 4027 nasal swabs and 3267 serum samples were collected from all countries. Real- time PCR revealed that MERS-CoV RNA was detected in nasal swab samples from Egypt, Senegal, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia. Microneutralization assay showed that antibodies were detected in all countries. Positive PCR samples were partially sequenced, and a phylogenetic tree was built. The tree suggested that all sequences are of clade C and sequences from camels in Egypt formed a separate group from previously published sequences. Longitudinal studies showed high seroprevalence in adult camels. These results indicate the widespread distribution of the virus in camels. A systematic active surveillance and longitudinal studies for MERS-CoV are needed to understand the epidemiology of the disease and dynamics of viral infection.

Cross-sectional surveillance of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in dromedary camels and other mammals in Egypt, August 2015 to January 2016.

A cross-sectional study was conducted in Egypt to determine the prevalence of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in imported and resident camels and bats, as well as to assess possible transmission of the virus to domestic ruminants and equines. A total of 1,031 sera, 1,078 nasal swabs, 13 rectal swabs, and 38 milk samples were collected from 1,078 camels in different types of sites. In addition, 145 domestic animals and 109 bats were sampled. Overall, of 1,031 serologically-tested camels, 871 (84.5%) had MERS-CoV neutralising antibodies. Seroprevalence was significantly higher in imported (614/692; 88.7%) than resident camels (257/339; 5.8%) (p < 0.05). Camels from Sudan (543/594; 91.4%) had a higher seroprevalence than those from East Africa (71/98; 72.4%) (p < 0.05). Sampling site and age were also associated with MERS-CoV seroprevalence (p < 0.05). All tested samples from domestic animals and bats were negative for MERS-CoV antibodies except one sheep sample which showed a 1:640 titre. Of 1,078 camels, 41 (3.8%) were positive for MERS-CoV genetic material. Sequences obtained were not found to cluster with clade A or B MERS-CoV sequences and were genetically diverse. The presence of neutralising antibodies in one sheep apparently in contact with seropositive camels calls for further studies on domestic animals in contact with camels.

Predominance and geo-mapping of avian influenza H5N1 in poultry sectors in Egypt.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus of the H5N1 subtype has been enzootic in the Egyptian poultry with significant human infections since 2008. This work evaluates the epidemiological and virological information from February 2006 to May 2015 in spatial and temporal terms. Only data with confirmed HPAI H5N1 sub-type were collected, and matched with the epidemiological data from various spatially and temporally-dispersed surveillances implemented between 2006 and 2015. Spatio-temporal analysis was conducted on a total of 3338 confirmed H5N1 HPAI poultry disease outbreaks and outputs described based on transmission patterns, poultry species, production types affected, trade, geographic and temporal distributions in Egypt. The H5N1 virus persists in the Egyptian poultry displaying a seasonal pattern with peak prevalence between January and March. There was no specific geographic pattern, but chickens and ducks were more affected. However, relatively higher disease incidences were recorded in the Nile Delta. Phylogenetic studies of the haemagglutinin gene sequences of H5N1 viruses indicated that multiple clusters circulated between 2006 and 2015, with significant deviations in circulation. Epidemiological dynamics of HPAI has changed with the origins of majority of outbreaks shifted to household poultry. The persistence of HPAI H5N1 in poultry with recurrent and sporadic infections in humans can influence virus evolution spatio-temporally. Household poultry plays significant roles in the H5N1 virus transmission to poultry and humans, but the role of commercial poultry needs further clarifications. While poultry trading supports the persistence and transmission of H5N1, the role of individual species may warrant further investigation. Surveillance activities, applying a multi-sectoral approach, are recommended.

Phylodynamics of avian influenza clade 2.2.1 H5N1 viruses in Egypt.

BACKGROUND: Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5N1 subtype are widely distributed within poultry populations in Egypt and have caused multiple human infections. Linking the epidemiological and sequence data is important to understand the transmission, persistence and evolution of the virus. This work describes the phylogenetic dynamics of H5N1 based on molecular characterization of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene of isolates collected from February 2006 to May 2014. METHODS: Full-length HA sequences of 368 H5N1 viruses were generated and were genetically analysed to study their genetic evolution. They were collected from different poultry species, production sectors, and geographic locations in Egypt. The Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (BMCMC) method was applied to estimate the evolutionary rates among different virus clusters; additionally, an analysis of selection pressures in the HA gene was performed using the Single Likelihood Ancestor Counting (SLAC) method. RESULTS: The phylogenetic analysis of the H5 gene from 2006-14 indicated the presence of one virus introduction of the classic clade (2.2.1) from which two main subgroups were originated, the variant subgroup which was further subdivided into 2 sub-divisions (2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.1a) and the endemic subgroup (2.2.1.2). The clade 2.2.1.2 showed a high evolution rate over a period of 6 years (6.9 × 10(-3) sub/site/year) in comparison to the 2.2.1.1a variant cluster (7.2 × 10(-3) over a period of 4 years). Those two clusters are under positive selection as they possess 5 distinct positively selected sites in the HA gene. The mutations at 120, 154, and 162 HA antigenic sites and the other two mutations (129∆, I151T) that occurred from 2009-14 were found to be stable in the 2.2.1.2 clade. Additionally, 13 groups of H5N1 HPAI viruses were identified based on their amino acid sequences at the cleavage site and "EKRRKKR" became the dominant pattern beginning in 2013. CONCLUSIONS: Continuous evolution of H5N1 HPAI viruses in Egypt has been observed in all poultry farming and production systems in almost all regions of the country. The wide circulation of the 2.2.1.2 clade carrying triple mutations (120, 129∆, I151T) associated with increased binding affinity to human receptors is an alarming finding of public health importance.

Experiences in participatory surveillance and community-based reporting systems for H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza: a case study approach.

Participatory surveillance (PS) is the application of participatory rural appraisal methods to the collection of epidemiological information to inform decision-making and action. It was applied in Africa and Asia as part of emergency programs to address the H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) pandemic. The approach resulted in markedly increased case detection in countries experiencing HPAI, and a better understanding of the epidemiological situation. Where HPAI was absent and PS was implemented, the method did not result in false positives and contributed to the overall epidemiological assessment that the country was free of disease. It was noted that clarity of surveillance objectives and resulting data needs at the outset was essential to optimize the balance of surveillance methods, size of the program and costs. The quality of training programs and adherence to international guidelines on good PS training practice were important for assuring the competence of PS practitioners. Orientation of senior decision-makers was an important step in assuring effective program management and appropriate use of results. As a problem-solving methodology, PS is best used to rapidly assess situations and inform strategy. Several countries continued PS after the end of projects and went on to apply PS to other health challenges.

Modelling influenza A H5N1 vaccination strategy scenarios in the household poultry sector in Egypt.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) due to H5N1 virus was first reported in Egypt in February 2006; since then, the government has allowed avian influenza vaccination in poultry. The present study evaluated the impact of AI vaccination in terms of cumulative annual flock immunity (CAFI): the percentage of bird × weeks protected by immunity. This evaluation took account of the combined effects of vaccination coverage, vaccine efficacy (VE), and different characteristics of household poultry production on the effectiveness of the adopted vaccination strategy (VS), and provided alternative options for improvement. The evaluation used a population and vaccination model that calculates the CAFI. Participatory approaches were employed in 21 villages to develop the vaccination and flock parameters required for the model. The adopted VS were compared in the model with three alternative VS scenarios in terms of the CAFI. Vaccination coverage varied among villages but was generally low (between 1 and 48 %; median 14 %). Under the adopted VS, the CAFI predicted for the villages ranged from 2 to 31 %. It was concluded that despite the enormous effort put into rural household poultry AI vaccination by the Egyptian government, village CAFI is unlikely to be maintained at the levels required to significantly reduce the virus load and restrict transmission. In HPAI-endemic countries that consider AI vaccination as one of the disease control options, the high cost of mass AI vaccination campaigns and their achievable benefits must be compared with other available control measures, which may include targeted vaccination. Achievable vaccination coverage, VE and the different characteristics of commercial and household (village) poultry production are key parameters determining the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of different AI vaccination strategies.